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ERISA AND THE PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
I. Introduction
Any valid law enacted by Congress becomes the "supreme law of
the land,"' and must be strictly adhered to by all the states. Con-
versely, if a state law burdens, interferes with or is contrary to a
valid federal law, the state law must necessarily yield.' Thus, the
state law is "preempted" by the superseding federal law.
The basis for this preemption doctrine lies in the supremacy
clause of the Federal Constitution.' The purpose of the supremacy
clause is to insure that federal laws will have national application
and force over any conflicting state laws.' Absent the supremacy
clause, conflicts arising from inconsistent state and federal require-
ments would be inevitable.5
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) s
was enacted by the Ninety-third Congress pursuant to the general
welfare' and commerce' clauses of the United States Constitution.
Congress recognized that "the growth in size, scope, and numbers
of employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and sub-
stantial"' directly affecting millions of employees and their depen-
dents.'" The economic impact of employee benefit plans on com-
merce was becoming "increasingly interstate."" The federal taxing
power was also directly affected because of the preferential treat-
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819).
2. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357-58 n.5 (1976); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666
(1962).
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
4. Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943).
5. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (Supp. V 1975).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The general Welfare clause states: "The Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States. ... Id.
8. Id. at § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause states: "To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. Id.
9. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (Supp. V 1975).
10. Id.
11. Id.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
ment accorded such plans." Congress appropriately noted that
these plans were "affected with a national public interest '"'3 requir-
ing the uniform application of federal substantive law to insure
their fiscal soundness, proper administration, and adequate judi-
cial remedy.' 4
ERISA is a broad-based legislative scheme ultimately designed to
readjust the regulatory roles of the state and federal governments
with respect to employee benefit plans. Federal preemption of the
state's authority to regulate employee benefit plans is contained in
Section 514 of ERISA.'5 This section has caused considerable con-
troversy at the state level. It is well established that when Congress
legislates to occupy exclusively an entire area that requires national
uniformity, any state regulation of that area is invalidated even if
it is harmonious with the federal statute.'6 However, controversy
arises when the Congressional intent is unclear, vague or ambiguous
as evidenced by the wording of the statute or by its legislative his-
tory or both. This Comment will analyze the language of ERISA's
preemption provisions, its legislative history, and the various court
interpretations of the preemption provisions.
II. ERISA's Preemption Provisions: The Statutory Language
The language and construction of a statute are the most immedi-
ate factors a court examines in determining the application of the
statute. When examining a statute, a court must look to the provi-
sions of the whole law, its object and purposes."
The term "employee benefit plan" encompasses pension plans
whereby retirement funds are held in trust by an employer or em-
ployee organization for the benefit of the employee. 8 Section 3(3),"9
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (Supp. V 1975). This section provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce
and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaaries, by
requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and
other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsi-
bility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
Id.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (Supp. V 1975).
16. 424 U.S. at 356.
17. Philbrook v. Goldgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975).
18. ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (Supp. V 1975). Employee pension benefit plan is
defined, in pertinent part, as follows:
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defines "employee benefit plan" to also include "employee welfare
benefit plan." This latter plan, also referred to as a "welfare plan,"
can provide such benefits as hospital, surgical or medical care,
scholarship funds, prepaid legal services, vacation benefits, training
programs, and sickness, accident or disability payments."0
"Employee" means "any individual employed by an employer."',
"Employer" is defined as "any person acting directly as an em-
ployer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an
employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of em-
ployers acting for an employer in such capacity." 2
Section 514 of ERISA 3 contains the actual provisions concerning
[Any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent
that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund,
or program -
(A) provides retirement income to employees, or
(B) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method
of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from
the plan.
19. Id., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (Supp. V 1975). Section 3(3) states: "The term 'employee
benefit plan' or 'plan' means an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit
plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension
benefit plan." Id. § 3(3).
20. Id. § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (Supp. V 1975). This section provides, in pertinent part:
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund
or program . . . maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical,
or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training pro-
grams, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services ...
Id.
21. Id. § 3(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (Supp. V 1975).
22. Id. § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (Supp. V 1975).
23. Id. § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (Supp. V 1975). Section 514 provides:
(a) Supersedure; effective date.
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section
1003(a) [Section 4(a)] of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) [Section
4(b)] of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
(b) Construction and application.
(1) This section shall not apply with respect to any cause of action which arose, or
any act or omission which occurred, before January 1, 1975.
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
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federal preemption. There are three particular clauses or provisos
that are essential for interpreting the breadth of federal preemp-
tion." The first clause is the "preemption" clause which authorizes
the federal government to regulate specified employee benefit
plans. 5 The second clause, the "state primacy" clause, permits the
insurance, banking, or securities.
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which
is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primar-
ily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such
a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust
company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or
banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance compa-
nies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit use by the Secretary of
services or facilities of a State agency as permitted under section 1136 of this title.
(4) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal
law of a State.
(c) Definitions.
For purposes of this section:
(1) The term "State law" includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other
State action having the effect of law, of any State. A law of the United States applica-
ble only to the District of Columbia shall be treated as a State law rather than a law
of the United States.
(2) The term "State" includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any
agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly,
the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this subchapter.
(d) Alteration, amendment, modification, invalidation, impairment, or supersedure of
any law of the United States prohibited.
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law of the United States (except as provided in sections 1031
and 1137(b) of this title) or any rule or regulation issued under any such law. Id.
(emphasis added).
24. The following chart is designed to serve as a quick reference for the terminology that
will be used throughout the text.
Clause Name Contained in Section # (Supp. V 1975)
preemption clause 514 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
state primacy clause 514(b) (2) (A), 29 U.S.C. §1144(b) (2) (A)
deemer clause 514(b) (2) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (B)
25. Section 514(a) was judicially labeled the "preemption" clause in Wadsworth v.
Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 76 n.34 (1st Cir. 1977); Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp.
695, 706 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Baines, 425F. Supp. 1294, 1297 n.10 (N.D.
Cal. 1977).
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states to continue to regulate insurance, banking and securities.'
The third clause or the "deemer" clause prevents the states from
enacting insurance, banking, and trust laws that affect employee
benefit plans.27
The preemption clause broadly states that "the provisions of this
subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan de-
scribed in section 1003(a) [Section 4(a)] of this title and not ex-
empt under section 1003(b) [Section 4(b)] of this title. '2 8
The preemption clause is clarified by reference to other provi-
sions. "State" is defined to "include a State, any political subdivi-
sion thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which pur-
ports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of
employee benefit plans covered by this title." 9 Section 4(a) states
that ERISA applies to any employee benefit- plan established or
maintained by "an employer" or "any employee organization 3 en-
gaged in any industry or activity affecting commerce.""1 Section
4(b) lists certain benefit plans that are exempt from ERISA regula-
tion. Such plans include:
(1) [A] governmental plan . . .1
(2) [A] church plan . . .1
26. The "state primacy" clause is the author's own terminology but has been referred to
as the "saving" clause in Wadsworth v. Whaland 562 F.2d at 75.
27. The "deemer" clause was labeled and discussed in Wadsworth. Id. at 77-78.
28. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (Supp. V 1975). (emphasis added).
29. Id. § 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975). (emphasis added). See text
accompanying notes 174-75 supra.
30. Employee organization is defined in ERISA § 3(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(4) (Supp. V 1975)
as follows:
The term "employee organization" means any labor union or any organization of any
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee, association, group, or plan,
in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part,
of dealing with employers concerning an employee benefit plan, or other matters inci-
dental to employment relationships; or any employees' beneficiary association organ-
ized for the purpose in whole or in part, of establishing such a plan.
Id.
31. Id. § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (Supp. V 1975).
32. "Governmental plan" is defined in id. § 3(32), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (Supp. V 1975).
It provides, in pertinent part, "a plan established or maintained for its employees by the
Government of the United States, by the government of any State or political subdivision
,thereof...." Id.
33. "Church plan" is defined in id. § 3(33), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33) (Supp. V 1975).
Although the definition is intricate, it generally means "a plan established and maintained
for its employees by a church or by a convention or association of churches which is exempt
from tax under section 501 of Title 26 [Internal Revenue Code of 1954]."
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(3) [A] plan maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applica-
ble workmen's compensation laws or uemployment compensation or disabil-
ity insurance laws;
(4) [A] plan . . . maintained outside of the United States primarily for the
benefit of persons substantially all of whom are non-resident aliens; or
(5) [An excess benefit plan3 . . .[that] is unfunded. 5
Therefore, any employee benefit plan not listed among these five
exceptions is subject to federal statutory regulation as set forth in
ERISA.
The second clause labeled the "state primacy" clause qualifies
the sweeping preemption clause of Section 514(a). The state pri-
macy clause has caused substantial controversy in determining the
extent of federal regulation of employee benefit plans. This proviso,
also quite broad, states that "[e]xcept as provided in subparagraph
(B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or
relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insur-
ance, banking, or securities.''3
However, subparagraph (B) contains the third clause or the
"deemer" clause which materially limits the state primacy clause:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) ... which is not
exempt under section 4(b) . . .(other than a plan established primarily for
the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established
under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the
business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purport-
ing to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust com-
panies, or investment companies. 7
The deemer clause thus prevents a state from wrongfully declar-
ing an employee benefit plan to be an insurer, bank, trust company,
or investment company for the purpose of regulating a plan that
would otherwise be properly subject to federal regulation under
ERISA.
34. "Excess benefit plan" is defined in id. § 3(36), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36) (Supp. V 1975).
It provides, in pertinent part:
[A] plan maintained by an employer solely for the purpose of providing benefits for
certain employees in excess of the limitations on contributions and benefits imposed
by section 415 of Title 26 [the Internal Revenue Code of 1954] on plans to which that
section applies without regard to whether the plan is funded.
Id.
35. Id. § 4(b)(1)-(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1)-(5) (Supp. V 1975).
36. Id. § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
37. Id. § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
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Where the language of a statute unequivocally expresses its
meaning, the courts are not required to probe into the legislative
history to ascertain Congressional intent. 8 However, if the statutory
language is susceptible to a number of possible constructions, as is
the case here, the courts have on occasion examined the entire
scheme of a statute to see whether it is so pervasive as to necessarily
supersede state power." In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,1° the
Supreme Court stated:
Congress legislated here in a field which the States have traditionally occu-
pied41 . . . .So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress . . . .Such a purpose may be
evidenced in several ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so perva-
sive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it.4"
It is evident that ERISA is a comprehensive statute. It imposes
multitudinous duties on those persons associated with the creation,
administration, and termination of employee benefit plans. The
Rice Court added:
[T]he Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the subject ...Or the state policy may produce a result
inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute. 3
Since employee benefit plans were becoming "increasingly inter-
state"" and were "affected with a national public interest," '45 there
is much merit to a broad interpretation of federal preemption of
employee benefit plans. Nevertheless, an examination of the legisla-
tive history of ERISA's preemption provisions is warranted to deter-
mine the degree of federal preemption intended by Congress.
38. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes,
425 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
39. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
40. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
41. Congress enacted the U.S. Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 241 et seq. in order to regulate
the operation of public warehouses.
42. 331 U.S. at 230.
43. Id.
44. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (Supp. V 1975).
45. Id.
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III. The Legislative History of ERISA's Preemption
Provisions
When investigating the legislative history of a particular statute,
authoritative interpretations revealing Congressional intent are the
committee reports and floor debates.46 For several years the House
Committee on Education and Labor heard testimony from various
individuals expressing differing views as to the proper extent and
breadth of federal preemption. Several prominent individuals fa-
miliar with employee benefit plans testified on behalf of absolute
federal preemption to protect plan participants and avoid chaotic
dual state and federal regulation.47 Others testified for limited fed-
eral preemption. 8
The extensive hearings failed to induce both Houses to adopt any
one particular view towards the preemption question. The House
version,4" the bill from which ERISA derives, was more specific and
narrow in delimiting the scope of federal preemption. The House
rendition provided, in pertinent part:
EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS
Sec. 514 (a) It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that
• . . the provisions of part 1 of this subtitle shall supersede any and all laws
of the States ... insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the reporting
and disclosure responsibilities, and fiduciary responsibilities...
(b) Nothing in part 1 of this subtitle shall be construed to exempt or relieve
any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking,
or securities .... No employee benefit plan subject to the provisions of this
46. United States v. International Union United Automobile, Aircraft, Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957).
47. See Proposed Welfare and Pension Plan Protection Act (forerunner of ERISA):
Hearings on H.R. 5741 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 185-86 (1968) [hereinafter 1968 Hearings]
(statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO) and
Proposed Revisions of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act: Hearings on H.R. 2 and
H.R. 462 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 315 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Hearings] (statement of
Preston C. Basset on behalf of Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc.) and (statement of
Lauren Upson, Member, California Banker's Association Committee on Employee Benefit
Trusts). Id., pt. 2, at 651.
48. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 47, at 338 (statement of Robert D. Hasse, Commissioner
of Insurance, State of Wisconsin) and 1973 Hearings, supra note 47, at 554-55 (statement of
John P. Thompson for the Southland Corporation) and id. at 188-95 (statement of Stanley
C. DuRose, Jr., Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Wisconsin).
49. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (enacted on February 28, 1974 by the House).
See 120 CONG. REC. 4742 (1974).
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title . . . nor any trust . . . shall be deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged
in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts...
(c) It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that . . . this
subtitle shall supersede any and all laws of the States . ..insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to the nonforfeitability of participant's benefits
...the funding requirements. . . the adequacy of financing. . . portabil-
ity requirements . . . or the insurance of pension benefits. ... 50
Although the House version contained a preemption clause, a
state primacy clause, and a deemer clause, the thrust of federal
regulation was specifically limited only to matters that "related to"
the reporting, disclosure, funding, financing, forfeitability, and fi-
duciary duties of employee benefit plans."
The Senate advanced a more ambiguous document:
(a) PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAWS - It is hereby declared to be the express
intent of Congress that ...the provisions of this Act ...shall supersede
any and all laws of the States. . .insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to the subject matters regulated by this Act . . .except that nothing herein
shall be construed -
(1) to exempt or relieve any employee benefit plan not subject to this Act
. ..from any law of any State;
(2) to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities or to prohibit a State from requir-
ing that there be filed with a State agency copies of reports required by this
Act to be filed with the Secretary .... 12
The Senate version differed from the House version in two key
respects. First, no deemer clause was provided. Since the deemer
clause was designed to prevent the states from enacting legislation
under the guise of insurance or banking or securities law to evade
ERISA, the failure to include such a clause undoubtedly weakens
any clear broad interpretation of federal superiority in the regula-
tion of employee benefit plans, especially when such plans retain
features similar to ordinary commercial insurance plans. Second,
the Senate version did not list any specific areas or aspects of em-
ployee benefit plans that were to be directly supervised by the fed-
eral government. Instead, the Senate chose to use the words "relate
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 5002 (emphasis added). The Senate version was passed on March 4, 1974.
1978]
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to thb subject matters regulated by this Act"53 for determining the
breadth and scope of federal preemption. Clearly, "relate to" and
"subject matters" can be broadly or narrowly interpreted depending
upon the circumstances.
The report of the Conference Committee ultimately proffered the
current ERISA preemption provisions as outlined in Section II of
this Comment. Essentially, the Conference Committee adopted the
wording of the House version. It used the preemption, state pri-
macy, and deemer clauses, but refused to limit federal regulation
of employee benefit plans to reporting, disclosure, funding, financ-
ing, forfeitability, and fiduciary duties. Instead, it chose to leave the
door open and allow for the federal preemption of all "State laws
insofar as they . . .relate to any employee benefit plan . . . not
exempt under section 4(b)."54 The final version of the Conference
Committee was more broad and sweeping than the House version
but less ambiguous than the Senate version. The Conference Report
states:
[Tihe provisions of title I are to supersede all State laws that relate to any
employee benefit plan that is established by an employer engaged in or
affecting interstate commerce or by an employee organization that represents
employees engaged in or affecting interstate commerce."
However, despite the good intentions of the Conference Commit-
tee to clarify the extent of federal preemption, it is apparent that
some courts are not convinced. The courts have frequently looked
to the record of the congressional floor debates prior to the enact-
ment of a particular bill to aid in their interpretation of Congres
sional intent." The Congressional Record contains several impor-
tant influential statements concerning ERISA's preemption made
by Congressmen who served as members of the various committees
responsible for drafting the preemptory language of ERISA and
53. Id.
54. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
55. S.R. 93-1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974) (emphasis added).
56. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951). The cases
referring to the congressional floor debates concerning preemption are: Wadsworth v. Wha-
land, 562 F.2d 70, 76-78 (1st Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 558 F.2d 680,
683 (1st Cir. 1977); Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 704-07 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Bell v, Employee Security Benefit Association, 437 F. Supp. 382, 385-88 (D. Kan. 1977);
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1297-1300 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Wayne
Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316, 321-22 (N.D. Ind. 1977);
Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F. Supp. 473, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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serving as managers for the bill in their respective Houses."
In the floor debates which followed the introduction of the Confer-
ence Committee version, Senator Jacob Javits, the ranking minority
member of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
commented on the three versions:
Both House and Senate bills provided for preemption of State law, but
- with one major exception appearing in the House bill 8 - defined the
perimeters of preemption in relation to the areas regulated by the bill. Such
a formulation raised the possibility of endless litigation over the validity of
State action that might impinge on Federal regulation, as well as opening the
door to multiple and potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to
deal with some particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans
not clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme."
The first official to comment in the floor debates about ERISA's
preemption provisions as advanced by the Conference Committee
was Representative John Dent, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Labor of the House Labor and Education Committee and floor man-
ager for ERISA in the House. He stated:
Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement
of this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to
regulate the field of employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field,
we round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat
of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation...
The conferees, with the narrow exceptions specifically enumerated, ap-
plied this principle in its broadest sense to foreclose any non-Federal regula-
tion of employee benefit plans. Thus, the provisions of section 514 would
reach any rule, regulation, practice or decision of any State. . . which would
affect any employee benefit plan as described in section 4(a) and not exempt
under section 4(b).'
Representative Dent's statement raises several interesting points.
First, Representative Dent explains that Section 514 was intended
to preempt the field of employee benefit plans for federal control in
the "broadest sense." Clearly, Representative Dent was referring
to the sweeping language of the preemption clause.' Second, the
57. Statements made by those persons who were directly involved with a particular bill
are the most influential for determining Congressional intent. City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 637 (1973).
58. Senator Javits was referring to the deemer clause as contained in H.R. 2. See text
accompanying note 49 supra.
59. 120 CONG. REC. at 29942.
60. Id. at 29197 (emphasis added).
61. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
1978] 609
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"broadest sense" application of the preemption provisions were sub-
ject to only "narrow exceptions." These narrow exceptions apply to
the five enumerated employee benefit plans not subject to ERISA
purview.2
A few days later Senator Harrison Williams, Jr., Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, similarly under-
lined the extent of ERISA's federal preemption:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, 3
the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are
intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the
threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee
benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all
actions of State and local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which
have the force or effect of law."A
It is interesting to note that Senator Williams used the same key
phrases as Representative Dent to describe the extent of federal
preemption. The Senator restated ERISA's "broadest sense" appli-
cation with "narrow exceptions."6 Later in the debate Senator Jav-
its declared:
Although the desirability of further regulation - at either the State or
Federal level - undoubtedly warrants further attention, on. balance, the
emergence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the inter-
ests of uniformity with respect to interstate plans required -but.for certain
exceptions - the displacement of State action in the field of private em-
ployee benefit programs."'
Although Senator Javits concurred in theory for broad federal
preemption, he indicated that the question would obviously require
further study. He was referring to Sections 3021 and 3022 of ERISA"7
which established the Joint Pension Task Force to study the effects
and desirability of federal preemption as well as other problems."
62. See notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra.
63. Id.
64. 120 CONG. REc. at 29933 (emphasis added).
65. Representative Dent used these phrases on August 20, 1974. Two days later Senator
Williams repeated the same key words.
66. 120 CONG. REC. at 29942 (emphasis added).
67. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1221-22 (Supp. V 1975).
68. Section 3022 provides:
(a) The Joint Pension Task Force shall, within 24 months after September 2, 1974,
make a full study and review of -
(1) the effect of the requirements of section 411 of Title 26 [the Internal
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Senators Javits and Williams and Representative Dent were es-
sentially stressing the same points. They all favored federal preemp-
tion in the "broadest sense" 9 with "narrow exceptions"70 in order
to prevent "conflicting and inconsistent State and local regula-
tion"'" of employee benefit plans. All advocated uniform national
regulations for employee benefit plans not excepted under Section
4(b) of ERISA.
Approximately two years later, the Joint Pension Task Force,
established pursuant to Sections 3021 and 3022,72 reported its con-
clusions concerning preemption to the House Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor.73 Although the report is not contemporaneous legis-
lative history,7 it is "virtually conclusive" as to legislative intent.7
After much study the Joint Pension Task Force concluded:
It is our understanding of this language [Section 514] that, with respect
to regulation of the activities of certain employee benefit plans (those subject
to ERISA jurisdiction), federal authority has been expressly extended to
occupy the field to the exclusion of state authority, subject to certain excep-
tions...
Based on our examination of the effects of section 514, it is our judgment
that the legislative scheme of ERISA is sufficiently broad to leave no room
for effective state regulation within the field preempted. Similarly it is our
Revenue Code of 1954] and of section 1053 of this title to determine the extent
of discrimination, if any, among employees in various age groups resulting from
the application of such requirements;
(2) means of providing for the portability of pension rights among different
pension plans;
(3) the appropriate treatment under subchapter M of this chapter (relating
to termination insurance) of plans established and maintained by small employ-
ers;
(4) the effects and desirability of the Federal preemption of State and local
law with respect to matters relating to pension and similar plans; and
(5) such other matter as any of the committees referred to in section 1221 of
this title may refer to it.
(b) The Joint Pension Task Force shall report the results of its study and review to
each of the committees referred to in section 1221 of this title.
Id., 29 U.S.C. § 1222 (Supp. V 1975).
69. See text accompanying notes 60 & 64 supra.
70. Id.
71. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
72. See note 68 supra.
73. H.R. REP. No. 1785 (Activity Report of the House Committee on Education and
Labor), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977) [hereinafter the Joint Pension Task Force Report].
74. ERISA's contemporanous legislative history is found in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4639-5198.
75. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1942).
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finding that the Federal interest and the need for national uniformity are so
great that the enforcement of state regulation should be precluded ... Ac-
cordingly, any activity by a state or political subdivision thereof, which
relates to employee benefit plans . . . is preempted by section 514(a).11
While the conclusions of the Joint Pension Task Force are not
legally binding on any court, it certainly is persuasive authority for
demonstrating Congressional intent." The conclusions of the Joint
Pension Task Force are in accord with the prior contemporaneous
legislative history of Section 514, i.e., federal preemption in the
broadest sense. Although this legislative history, along with the sta-
tutory language and the pervasive statutory scheme, seem to indi-
cate that Congress intended ERISA to be the sole source of private
employee benefit plan regulation, the courts have differed over the
intended degree of federal preemption.
IV. The Courts Diverge Over The Breadth Of Federal
Preemption
The development of case law relating to the preemption issue has
been modest. The first court to address the preemption issue, albeit
briefly, was the District Court for the Southern District of New York
in Azzaro v. Harnett." Plaintiff-trustees of a union pension fund
brought suit to enjoin the defendant Superintendent of Insurance of
New York State from making any inquiries into the pension benefit
status of a pension fund participant after January 1, 1975, the effec-
tive date of ERISA's preemption provisions." Plaintiffs argued that
the jurisdiction of the New York State Insurance Department over
employee pension plans was superseded by the United States De-
partment of Labor by virtue of Section 514(a) of ERISA. The defen-
dant contended that the pension participant earned pension bene-
fits prior to January 1, 1975 and thus, the New York State Insurance
Department was not superseded in this matter by ERISA Section
514(b)(1).10 Plaintiff countered that if the defendant prevailed, the
state insurance department would continue to have jurisdiction over
76. Joint Pension Task Force Report, supra note 73, at 46-47 (emphasis added).
77. 316 U.S. at 329-30.
78. 414 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977).
79. Id. at 473-74. ERISA § 514(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975) provides,
"This section shall not apply with respect to any to cause of action which arose, or any act
or omission which occurred, before January 1, 1975." Id.
80. 414 F. Supp. at 474.
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all employees who were enrolled in employee benefit plans prior to
January 1, 1975. In sum, plaintiffs would be subject to "concurrent
state and federal jurisdiction."'" The Azzaro court stated that an
examination of the legislative history was necessary to decide
whether the state had supervisory jurisdiction over employee pen-
sion benefit plans."2 The court cited, in particular, Senator Wil-
liams' statement that characterized federal preemption in the
"broadest sense" with "narrow exceptions." 3 The Azzaro court con-
cluded that "[t]he legislative history of ERISA shows that Con-
gress intended absolute preemption of the field of employee benefit
plans." ' The court agreed with Congress that "preemption was in-
tended to provide for uniform regulation of employee benefit
plans."" It reasoned that the whole purpose of ERISA - the uni-
form federal regulation of employee benefit plans - would be con-
travened if the defendant were to succeed. 8 The court held that
state regulation was clearly reduced to a "cleanup role" in that it
had limited jurisdiction to handle only causes of action and disputes
arising prior to January 1, 1975.7
Several months later the preemption question was discussed in
one paragraph by the District Court for Minnesota in Insurer's Ac-
tion Council, Inc. v. Heaton.8 Plaintiff-insurance companies
brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Minne-
sota Commissioner of Insurance"5 challenging the constitutionality
of the Minnesota Comprehensive Health Insurance Act of 1976.10
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
84. 414 F. Supp. at 474 (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 475.
88. 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
89. Id. at 923. Other defendants included the Insurance Division of the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Commerce, and the Minnesota Comprehensive Health Association, an association
created by the Minnesota Comprehensive Health Insurance Act of 1976 and composed of all
commercial insurers, fraternals, self insurers, and health maintenance organizations who
desire to write accident and health insurance in Minnesota. Id.
90. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62E.01 et seq. (1976). The Minnesota act required all health and
accident insurers to offer state residents a minimum specified amount of major medical
coverage. 423 F. Supp. at 923. Furthermore, health care plans offered to employees were to
contain specific minimum mandated benefits. Id. Finally, the act created the Minnesota
Comprehensive Health Association to provide health and accident insurance for those persons
unable to obtain such insurance through normal channels. Id.
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Aside from arguments based on due process,9' equal protection,"
vagueness, 3 and impairment of contract," the plaintiffs also as-
serted that the Minnesota act was preempted by ERISA Section
514(a) which provides that all state laws relating to employee bene-
fit plans are superseded by ERISA15 The court labeled this latter
assertion as "superficial" and "questionable at best.", It upheld the
Minnesota statute based on three grounds. First, the court relied on
the state primacy clause (Section 514(b)(2)(A)) whereby ERISA
should not relieve any person from any state law regulating insur-
ance. 7 Obviously, the court regarded the Minnesota act as primarily
regulating insurance, in particular health and accident insurance,
and not employee benefit plans. The court did admit that the state
primacy clause was limited by the deemer clause (Section
514(b)(2)(B)). However, the court construed this limitation as a
"very narrow exception. 9 8 Second, the court utilized Section
514(d)99 whereby ERISA shall not be interpreted to impair or su-
persede any law of the United States, citing in particular the
McCarran-Ferguson Act'00 which mandates that the business of in-
surance shall be regulated by the states.'' Third, the court stated
that the Minnesota statute regulated the substance of health and
accident insurance plans and not reporting and disclosure require-
ments which are the chief concerns of ERISA. 10 For some reason the
court failed to discuss the appropriate legislative history of Section
514 in reaching its conclusions.
The rationale of the Insurer's Action Council court was disputed
by the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana in Wayne
91. Id. at 923-25.
92. Id. at 926.
93. Id. at 925.
94. Id. at 926-27.




99. Id. See note 23 supra for text of section 514(d).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. (1970). 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) provides, in pertinent part, that
"no Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted
by any State for the purpose of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance." Id.
101. 423 F. Supp. at 926.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
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Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp. 103 In Wayne
Chemical, the employer, a covered employee and his covered depen-
dent quadriplegic son brought suit against insurers to enforce bene-
fit rights under a plan they were led to believe constituted an ordi-
nary commercial group health insurance plan.1'0 The plaintiffs fur-
ther contended that an Indiana statute'05 provided that group health
insurance coverage of a dependent of an employee may not termi-
nate on attainment of a limiting age where the dependent, at the
time he reaches the limiting age, is disabled. 106 The defendants
maintained that the Indiana statute was inapplicable because the
recently issued policy was actually an employee benefit plan subject
to exclusive federal regulation as stated in Section 514(a). In sum,
they argued ERISA had preempted the applicability of the Indiana
statute and, as a result, no benefits could be conferred to the em-
ployee's dependent son. 10
The issue in Wayne Chemical was threefold. The first question
was whether the present policy was an employee benefit plan. 08 If
this were so, was it subject to ERISA purview?'" Finally, if the state
law was inapplicable and no specific federal statute governed the
issues involved in the case, could the court create federal common
law to fill the void?"0
The court had no difficulty in concluding that the policy issued
by the defendants was indeed an employee benefit plan within the
meaning of ERISA and thus subject to ERISA."' The Indiana stat-
ute became inoperative by virtue of the preemption clause con-
tained in Section 514(a) .112 The court analyzed ERISA's legislative
history concerning preemption and concurred with the prior conclu-
sion of the Azzaro court, namely, "that Congress intended absolute
[federal] preemption of the field of employee benefit plans. ' " 3 In
103. 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
104. Id. at 318-19.
105. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-5-10(B)(4) (Burns 1975).
106. 426 F. Supp. at 319.
107. Id. at 319-20.
108. Id. at 320.
109. Id. at 321.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 320.
112. Id. at 321:
113. Id. (quoting Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F. Supp. at 474).
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reaching its decision, the court scrutinized the statutory language"'
and referred to the statements of Senator Javits in support of the
Conference Committee's version of Section 514."11 The Wayne
Chemical court, unlike the Insurer's Action Council court, attached
a minimum of importance to the McCarran-Ferguson Act in deter-
mining ERISA's breadth of preemption. That court's rationale was
that "some specific effort by Congress would be required to over-
come state laws regulating insurance" and thus bypass the
McCarran-Ferguson Act."' The Wayne Chemical court was con-
vinced that Congress had indeed demonstrated more than a
"specific effort" to preclude any state regulation of private em-
ployee benefit plans by enacting the comprehensive ERISA statute.
Therefore, the court held that ERISA must be given effect." 7 If the
court had held otherwise, it would have essentially nullified the
purposes-and effectiveness of ERISA.
After declaring the Indiana statute inapplicable, the court reason-
ably inferred that ERISA's statutory scheme and legislative his-
tory"8 permitted the court to formulate federal common law with
regard to employee benefit plans."' The court ultimately incorpo-
rated the essential characteristics of the Indiana statute into federal
common law granting relief to the plaintiffs.'12
Unlike Insurer's Action Council, Wayne Chemical was not preoc-
cupied with distinguishing between a state law that regulated the
substance of insurance coverage and one that regulated reporting
and disclosure requirements. The Insurer's Action Council court
would uphold the validity of a state law that affected the substance
of the insurance contract as being a proper subject for state regula-
tion as supported by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. It would neces-
sarily preempt a state law that affected reporting and disclosure
requirements due to ERISA. In effect, federal preemption was lim-
ited to preserve the state's right to regulate insurance, Wayne
114. Id. at 320-21.
115. Id. at 321.
116. Id. at 320 n.1.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 321-22. The court cited remarks made by Senator Javits to support its infer-
ence: "It is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the
courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension
plans. 120 CONG. Rv. 29942.
119. 426 F. Supp. at 321.
120. Id. at 325.
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Chemical's approach was to preempt absolutely any state law
"relating to" ERISA covered employee benefit plans regardless of
its content. This would allow the courts to create federal common
law which could either adopt the thrust of the inapplicable state law
or alternatively fashion a new law. The. Wayne Chemical court
noted that "state statutory sources of law will no doubt play a major
role in the development of a federal common law under ERISA,
particularly in defining rights under employee benefit plans."'', In
sum, the Wayne Chemical rationale affords the federal courts the
necessary means to achieve the objectives of ERISA, i.e., to perpe-
tuate national uniform regulations and avoid the threat of conflict-
ing or inconsistent state and local regulations of employee benefit
plans.
Five days after Wayne Chemical, the Federal District Court for
Northern California in Hewlett-Packard Company v. Barnes",
reached a similar result.2 3 In Hewlett-Packward, plaintiff employ-
ers and employee benefit organizations sought declaratory and per-
manent injunctive relief against the California Commissioner of
Corporations challenging the validity of the California Knox-Keene
Health Care Services Plan Act of 1975.124 The Knox-Keene Act was
intended to provide quality health care at a low cost to plan par-
ticipants. Plaintiffs argued that ERISA preempted the Knox-Keene
Act because the employee welfare benefit plans or health service
plans offered by Knox-Keene were actually ERISA covered plans
and thus preempted by Section 514(a). 2 5
The defendant advanced four arguments: first, the language of
ERISA's preemption clause was vague and ambiguous as to whether
ERISA preempted health services plans such as those regulated by
the Knox-Keene Act; second, the legislative history of ERISA failed
to reveal Congressional intent to supersede state laws such as Knox-
Keene; third, Knox-Keene was a state law regulating insurance and
therefore was exempt from federal preemption under Section
121. Id.
122. 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
123. Wayne Chemical was decided on January 19, 1977 and Hewlett-Packard was decided
on January 24, 1977. Due to the closeness in time of the decisions and the different circuits
involved, the Hewlett-Packard court probably had no knowledge of the Wayne Chemical
holding.
124. 425 F. Supp. at 1296. The Knox-Keene Act is found at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 1340-1395.5 (West Supp. 1977).
125. 425 F. Supp. at 1296.
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514(b)(2)(A), the state primacy clause; and finally, Section 514(a)
was unconstitutional because the Tenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution precludes such a broad substitution of national for
local regulation. '
The Hewlett-Packard court dismissed defendant's first conten-
tion, declaring that Congress could not have used any more
"precise" statutory language to preempt such state laws as Knox-
Keene that related to employee benefit plans.'27 The court made an
in depth analysis of ERISA's legislative history concerning preemp-
tion. '2s It discussed the chronological development of the several
Congressional versions advocating various degrees of federal
preerpption, referred to the Conference Committee report'29 and
made extensive use and reproduced in full all pertinent floor debate
statements by some of ERISA's key legislative figures - Senators
Williams and Javits and Representative Dent.'30 All these reports
and statements compelled the court to conclude that:
Overall, the legislative history reveals both that Congress carefully consid-
ered the question of preemption, including the feasibility of enacting a more
limited preemption provision, and that Congress ultimately enacted Section
514(a) with the express purpose of summarily preempting state regulation of
ERISA-covered employee benefit plans. That the statute, standing alone or
buttressed by its legislative history, was intended to supersede state regula-
tion of benefit plans such as plaintiffs' is indisputable."'
The Hewlett-Packard court also dealt unfavorably with the defen-
dant's third contention by invoking Section 514(b)(2)(B), the dee-
mer clause. The court held that a state could not evade ERISA's
jurisdiction by simply treating certain employee benefit plans as a
''unique variety of insurance arrangement" subject to special state
enacted regulations such as the Knox-Keene Act.'32 To hold other-
wise would "contravene the clear intent of Section 514(a) and (b)
of ERISA that employee benefit plans, so dubbed or under any other
name, be free of state regulation."'3 3
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1297.
128. Id. at 1297-1300.
129. Id. at 1298-99. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
130. 425 F. Supp. at 1499-1300. See text accompanying notes 59, 60, 64, & 66 supra for
content of statements made by Senators Williams and Javits and Representative Dent.





Finally, the court could not agree with the defendant that the
Tenth Amendment'34 undermined ERISA's validity. The court ac-
knowledged that the Tenth Amendment prevents Congress from
regulating states under the commerce power in a manner that ad-
versely affects the states' ability to function effectively in the federal
system.' 35 However, the court added that the Tenth Amendment
imposes no limitation on Congress' application of the commerce
power to the private sector. The court held that ERISA specifically
excluded federal regulation of government plans by virtue of Section
4(b), '3 and thus an adverse encroachment on state sovereignty was
non-existent. 17
By declaring the Knox-Keene Act inapplicable and holding for
the plaintiffs, the Hewlett-Packard court necessarily adopted a
broad interpretation of federal preemption similar to that of Wayne
Chemical. Neither court preoccupied itself with first determining
whether the particular state law regulated the substance of insur-
ance or the reporting and disclosure requirements as did the
Insurer's Action Council court. Instead, they utilized a more simple
absolute preemption test; that is, if a state law merely "relates to"
an employee benefit plan as defined by ERISA, then it is absolutely
preempted by ERISA.
Two other subsequent decisions favored absolute federal preemp-
tion of employee benefit plans. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank13 stated:
The superior federal interest sought to be vindicated here is clear from...
[§] 514 of the Act as well as its legislative history which establish the
congressional intent that the United States regulate the field of employee
benefit plans eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent local regu-
lation. "'
Essentially, the rationale in Azzaro had been affirmed. 40
134. The tenth amendment provides that: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
135. 425 F. Supp. at 1301 and n.19. See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
136. See notes 32 and 35 and accompanying text supra.
137. 425 F. Supp. at 1301 and n.19.
138. 558 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1977).
139. Id. at 683. See also id. at 683 n.5 which quotes Representative Dent's remarks indi-
cating the importance of ERISA's preemption provisions.
140. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
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The second case, Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Association,",
involved an action for permanent injunctive relief brought by the
Kansas Commissioner of Insurance against the Employee Security
Benefit Association (ESBA), an unincorporated association selling
major medical and death benefit plans substantially similar to those
offered by ordinary insurance companies.' The Commissioner con-
tended that ESBA's plans were insurance policies subject to state
regulation by the Kansas Department of Insurance and not an
ERISA covered employee benefit plan as maintained by the defen-
dant entrepreneurs.' The District Court for the District of Kansas
ultimately held that ESBA's plans were not employee benefit plans
because they were not established by "employers" or "employee
organizations" as is required for an ERISA covered employee bene-
fit plan."' Therefore, ESBA plans were subject to state regulation.
ERISA simply did not apply."45
Nevertheless, the ESBA court discussed at length the scope of
ERISA's preemption analyzing the statutory language and its legis-
lative history."4 The court stated that "[in light of [the] legisla-
tive history, we conclude that federal preemption in the area of
pensions and other employee benefit programs is virtually total.""' 7
The ESBA court specifically stated that it had rejected the limited
preemption view espoused by Insurer's Action Council."18 Instead, it
embraced the absolute federal preemption approach of the Azzaro,
Wayne Chemical, and Hewlett-Packard courts. 4 To bolster its con-
clusion, the ESBA court cited the recent report of the Joint Pension
Task Force 50 stating that federal authority was expressly intended
to occupy the field of employee benefit plans to the exclusion of
state regulation. 5' It is therefore clear that the court would have had
no difficulty in preventing the Kansas Department of Insurance
141. 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
142. Id. at 384.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 392. The court supplied four factors for distinguishing between an employee
benefit plan and an ordinary insurance plan. Id. at 391.
145. Id. at 396.
146. Id. at 385-88.
147. Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
151. 437 F. Supp. at 388.
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from interfering with ESBA's activities if the ESBA policies had
been true ERISA covered employee benefit plans. The court would
have applied the absolute preemption test1"2 to preempt and declare
inapplicable any Kansas regulation "relating to" employee benefit
plans.
It appeared from the holdings in these cases that a trend was
emerging in favor of ERISA's absolute preemption of employee ben-
efit plans. However, this trend was temporarily impeded by the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Wadsworth v. Whaland.53
The plaintiffs, administrators of various health and welfare funds,
brought suit in the District Court for New Hampshire against the
New Hampshire Commissioner of Insurance seeking declaratory re-
lief to invalidate a New Hampshire law1"' mandating coverage of
mental and nervous conditions in group health and accident insur-
ance policies.' 55 The plaintiffs contended that Section 514
preempted any "direct or indirect" regulation of employee benefit
plans by the state.'56 They therefore asserted that the New Hamp-
shire law is necessarily superseded by ERISA because it "relates to
employee benefit plans."'57
The Court of Appeals in Wadsworth conceded that ERISA's legis-
lative history suggested federal preemption of all state laws that
related to employee benefit plans.'58 The court further conceded that
the New Hampshire law indirectly related to employee benefit
plans, but concluded that preemption did not necessarily follow.',
Its reasons were several. First, the New Hampshire law was not a
disclosure law nor did it purport to regulate employee benefit plans
directly.' Rather, it was specifically codified as an insurance law
regulating insurers. 6' Second, the New Hampshire statute, as pri-
marily an insurance regulation, was exempt from federal preemp-
152. The "absolute preemption test" can be stated generally as follows: If a state law
relates to an employee benefit plan covered under ERISA, whether directly or indirectly, then
it is absolutely preempted by ERISA.
153. 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977).
154. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 415:18(I)(a), 419:5(1), 420:5(1) (1975).
155. 562 F.2d at 72-73.
156. Id. at 75-76.
157. Id. at 76.
158. Id. at 77
159. Id.
160. Id. at 76.
161. Id.
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tion due to the state primacy clause, Section 514(b)(2) (A). '6 Third,
although the deemer clause prevents a state from declaring an em-
ployee benefit plan to be insurance for the purposes of its insurance
laws, it "does not prohibit a state from indirectly affecting
[employee benefit] plans by regulating the contents of group insur-
ance policies purchased by the plans.' ' 3 The court reasoned that to
declare inapplicable a state regulation that merely "indirectly" af-
fected or related to an employee benefit plan would unjustly deny
the states their authority to regulate insurance as preserved by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.'
Wadsworth, following the same approach used earlier in Insurer's
Action Council, concluded that state statutes primarily codified as
insurance laws regulating the substance or contents of insurance are
valid even if they indirectly affect an ERISA covered employee ben-
efit plan. Furthermore, only direct state interference with an em-
ployee benefit plan triggers federal preemption. Direct state inter-
ference occurs when a state regulation affects the administration of
an ERISA covered employee benefit plan by mandating reporting
and disclosure requirements. 5 Thus, Wadsworth and Insurer's Ac-
tion Council have clearly embraced a limited view of preemption in
order to preserve a state's right to regulate insurance even if such
state regulation indirectly affects ERISA plans.
The trend towards absolute federal preemption was restored in
Standard Oil Co. Of California v. Agsalud'6 whereby the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of California held that the
Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act6 7 was preempted by ERISA and
therefore inapplicable to all ERISA covered employee benefit
plans. ' 8
The Hawaii statute required the workers in the state be covered
162. Id. at 77.
163. Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 78. Insurer's Action Counsel used the same analysis. See note 100 supra and
text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
165. 562 F.2d at 73-74. The Wadsworth court views the scope of ERISA as being primarily
administrative in nature. The court lists examples of ERISA's administrative requirements
for employee benefit plans and the court's holding seems to suggest that if a state law were
to interfere with any of these administrative requirements, it would have to be preempted.
Insurer's Action Council made the same distinction at 423 F. Supp. at 926.
166. 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
167. HAw. REv. STAT. § 393-1 - 393-51 as amended 1976 Haw. Sess. Laws ch. 25.
168. 442 F. Supp. at 707.
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by a comprehensive prepaid health care plan.' 9 The statute also
contained various reporting requirements that differed from those
of ERISA.'70 The court was confronted with having to decide
whether ERISA preempted the Hawaii statute."'
The Standard Oil court, contra to Wadsworth and Insurer's Ac-
tion Council, utilized the absolute preemption test and determined
that if any state law "related to" ERISA covered plans, it was
necessarily preempted."' To determine the meaning of "relates to,"
the court stated that there could be no distinction between a state
law relating to the substance of insurance benefits and one that
related to administration. The court precisely stated the weakness
of the limited preemption test:
Laws relating to benefits of employee benefit plans relate to those plans as
much as laws relating to their administration. There is simply no basis in the
language of § 514(a) for distinguishing between types of state laws all of
which "relate to" employee benefit plans. When Congress says "any and all
State laws," courts cannot conclude that Congress really meant to say "some
but not all State laws."1 3
In addition, the court reasoned that Section 514(c)(2)' 71 clearly indi-
* cated that Congress intended to broadly preempt all state laws
directly or indirectly affecting employee benefit plans leaving no
room for state authority."
However, the absolute preemption rationale also contains a key
deficiency, although perhaps an inadvertent one. This deficiency
was discussed briefly in Standard Oil. The passage of ERISA cou-
pled with the application of the absolute preemption rationale have
created a "moratorium of indefinite length on the passage of health
insurance laws" possessing the depth and comprehension of the
Hawaii act.'17 The court, although it preempted the Hawaii statute
from affecting ERISA covered plans, was reluctant to do so and
would have preferred to await further instruction from Congress. 7 7
169. Id. at 696.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 697.
172. Id. at 707.
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
175. 442 F. Supp. at 707 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 711.
177. Id.
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The millions of people whom ERISA was intended to protect Its
would be additionally protected by comprehensive state health in-
surance laws like the Hawaii law than without them.'79 Efforts by
the various state legislatures to provide such additional protection
for these people already under ERISA's umbrella would be futile so
long as ERISA continued to preempt and render inapplicable all
state laws relating to ERISA covered plans.8 0
V. Conclusion
A trend has emerged in the federal courts in favor of the absolute
federal preemption rationale based upon ERISA's broad statutory
language as contained in at least the preemption clause. This view
is further supplemented by the legislative history of Section 514. 18
The limited preemption view and the absolute preemption view
both share the same result in at least preempting state laws that
relate to the administration of ERISA covered plans. These state
laws, although not declared void per se, are inapplicable to ERISA
employee benefit plans.'82 However, the difference between the two
views crystalizes when there is a state law that regulates the sub-
stance of insurance and indirectly affects an ERISA covered plan.
The advocates of the limited preemption view, citing the state pri-
macy clause, the deemer clause and the McCarran-Ferguson Act for
support, would validate the state law as being within the state's
authority to regulate insurance. Thus, there would be no federal
preemption by ERISA. s3
A contrary result occurs when applying the absolute preemption
approach. It simply holds that there can be no distinction between
state laws that affect the administration or substantive insurance
benefits of an ERISA covered plan. Both "relate to" the plan,
whether directly or indirectly, and therefore are necessarily su-
perseded by ERISA. s8 These state laws will have no effect on ERISA
178. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. V 1975).
179. The Hawaii act was unique and has been held up as a model for a national health
insurance plan. 442 F. Supp. at 711 n.14.
180. Id. at 711.
181. The trend for absolute federal preemption is supported by the Azzaro, Wayne Chemi-
cal, Hewlett-Packard, Chase Manhattan Bank, ESBA, and Standard Oil decisions.
182. The cases cited in note 181 supra would support this contention as do the cases
advocating the limited preemption view, i.e., Insurer's Action Council and Wadsworth.
183. See 562 F.2d at 77-78; 423 F. Supp. at 926.





Both views contain faults. The limited preemption view tends to
undermine the pervasive federal interest of establishing and main-
taining uniform national laws regulating employee benefit plans.
Moreover, if limited preemption is applied to only some aspects of
a state law and not others, one questions how effective the remain-
ing state law will be. To preempt a state law, in whole or in part,
would be at the heart of every controversy. Tension between the
federal courts and the state legislatures would likely increase.
Alternatively, the absolute preemption view could seriously
hinder the states' authority to regulate insurance, simply because
any state law might, in some indirect way, affect an ERISA covered
plan and thus be subject to preemption. Although this may have
been what Congress intended, Congress should take a serious second
look at whether it intends ERISA to preempt a state comprehensive
health insurance law such as the one enacted by the Hawaii legisla-
ture. Since millions of employees and their dependents are directly
affected by whatever rationale is utilized. Congress might be well
advised to strike a balance between the two views by further clarify-
ing the breadth of federal preemption.
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